

Self-referentiality in the framework of justification logics

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Outline

- Realization in Justification Logic
- Self-referentiality
- Properties of non-self-referential fragments

- Realization in Justification Logic

Justification logics JL

- **Explicit versions** of modal logics ML.
 - $\Box\phi$ v.s. $t:\phi$,
 - t explains contents implicitly indicated by \Box .
- Language: propositional, extended by $t:\phi$.
 - t is a **term** (inductively defined, sensitive to logics),
 - ϕ is a formula in **this** language (where terms may occur in).
- The family of JL: > 30 members, serving as explicit versions to many well-known ML's.
 - We will focus on the following five pairs:

ML		K	D	T	K4	S4
JL		J	JD	JT	J4	LP

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The Logic of Proofs LP as an example

- By Artemov in 1995.
- $\phi := \perp \mid p \mid \phi \rightarrow \phi \mid t : \phi,$
 $t := c \mid x \mid t \cdot t \mid t + t \mid !t.$
- Axiom schemes:
 - Classical propositional axioms,
 - $t : \phi \rightarrow \phi,$
 - $t_1 : (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (t_2 : \phi \rightarrow t_1 \cdot t_2 : \psi),$
 - $t : \phi \rightarrow !t : \phi,$
 - $t_1 : \phi \rightarrow t_1 + t_2 : \phi$ and $t_2 : \phi \rightarrow t_1 + t_2 : \phi.$
- Rules schemes:
 - $\alpha \rightarrow \beta, \alpha \vdash \beta,$
 - $\vdash c : A,$ where c is a constant, and A is an axiom.
- Explicit version of modal logic S4.
- Formally, the implicit/explicit correspondence is called **realization**.

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Realization

- Realizer
 - A mapping: the language of ML \rightsquigarrow that of a JL;
 - Assigns a term to each \Box -occurrence in the input formula.
- Realization
 - Given realizer $(\cdot)^r$ and modal formula ϕ , the image ϕ^r is a potential realization;
 - ϕ^r is a realization if further $\text{JL} \vdash \phi^r$.

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Realization (continued)

- Realization theorem (Artemov 1995 & Brezhnev 2000)
 - For any modal formula ϕ :
 - Let $X \in \{K, D, T, K4, S4\}$,
 - and $Y \in \{J, JD, JT, J4, LP\}$, resp.,
 - Then what follows are equivalent:
 - $X \vdash \phi$;
 - $Y \vdash \phi^r$ for some realizer $(\cdot)^r$.

- Self-referentiality

Self-referential JL-formulas

- (recalled) Justification language (LP as an example)
 - Formula $\phi := \perp \mid p \mid \phi \rightarrow \phi \mid t : \phi$;
 - Term $t := c \mid x \mid t \cdot t \mid t + t \mid !t$.
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Constant specification \mathcal{CS}

- Definition (take LP as our example):
 - A set of formulas of the form $c : A$.
- Link axioms with constants that present them in terms.
- $JL(\mathcal{CS})$ is the fragment of JL where rule scheme AN can only put formulas from \mathcal{CS} .
 - e.g., $JL(\emptyset)$ is the fragment of JL without AN .

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Self-referentiality of \mathcal{CS}

- Take LP as our example.
- \mathcal{CS} is (directly) self-referential, if for some c and A

$$c : A(c) \in \mathcal{CS}.$$

- Let $\mathcal{CS}^* := \{c : A \mid c \text{ does not occur in } A\}$;
 - The largest non-self-referential constant specification.
 - Thus, $\text{JL}(\mathcal{CS}^*)$ is the fragment of JL where AN can only introduce non-self-referential formulas.

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ML^{NR} : non-self-referential realizable fragment of ML

- Definition:

- Let $X \in \{K, D, T, K4, S4\}$,
 and $Y \in \{J, JD, JT, J4, LP\}$, resp.;
- $X^{NR} := \{X \vdash \phi \mid Y(CS^*) \vdash \phi^r \text{ for some realizer } (\cdot)^r\}$.
- A model theorem is
 non-self-referential if being in ML^{NR} ,
 and self-referential otherwise.

- Self-referential modal-theorems exist. (Kuznets 2006 & 2008):

- $K^{NR} = K$
- $D^{NR} = D$
- $\diamond(p \rightarrow \Box p) \in T \setminus T^{NR}$
- $\Box \neg(p \rightarrow \Box p) \rightarrow \Box \perp \in K4 \setminus K4^{NR}$
- $\diamond(p \rightarrow \Box p) \in S4 \setminus S4^{NR}$

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Realizing intuitionistic propositional logic IPC via S4

- The initial motivation of Artemov's LP;
- The Gödel–Artemov formalization of BHK semantics;
- Gödel's modal embedding $(\cdot)^\Delta$ is a mapping from propositional language to propositional modal language that satisfies:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} p^\Delta = \Box p \\ \perp^\Delta = \Box \perp \\ (\phi \oplus \psi)^\Delta = \Box(\phi^\Delta \oplus \psi^\Delta) \text{ for } \oplus \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}. \end{array} \right.$$

- Sound and faithfully embeds IPC into S4, i.e.,
 $\text{IPC} \vdash \phi$ iff $\text{S4} \vdash \phi^\Delta$ (McKinsey & Tarski 1948).

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Basic embeddings

- An extension of Gödel's modal embedding.
- A potential embedding $((\cdot)^{\times})$ is **basic** if (let $\odot \in \{\wedge, \vee\}$):

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \phi^{\times} = \phi_{+}^{\times} \\ p_{+}^{\times} = \Box^{h_{+}} p \quad p_{-}^{\times} = \Box^{h_{-}} p \quad \text{similar for } \perp \\ (\phi \odot \psi)_{+}^{\times} = \Box^{j_{\odot+}} (\Box^{k_{\odot+}} \phi_{+}^{\times} \odot \Box^{l_{\odot+}} \psi_{+}^{\times}) \\ (\phi \odot \psi)_{-}^{\times} = \Box^{j_{\odot-}} (\Box^{k_{\odot-}} \phi_{-}^{\times} \odot \Box^{l_{\odot-}} \psi_{-}^{\times}) \\ (\phi \rightarrow \psi)_{+}^{\times} = \Box^{j_{\rightarrow+}} (\Box^{k_{\rightarrow+}} \phi_{-}^{\times} \rightarrow \Box^{l_{\rightarrow+}} \psi_{+}^{\times}) \\ (\phi \rightarrow \psi)_{-}^{\times} = \Box^{j_{\rightarrow-}} (\Box^{k_{\rightarrow-}} \phi_{+}^{\times} \rightarrow \Box^{l_{\rightarrow-}} \psi_{-}^{\times}) \end{array} \right.$$

- A **basic embedding** is a potential one that satisfies:
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- Definition:

- $IPC^{NR(\times)} := \{IPC \vdash \phi \mid \phi^{\times} \in S4^{NR}\};$
- $IPC^{NR} := \bigcup_{\times} IPC^{NR(\times)};$
- An intuitionistic theorem is **non-self-referential** if being in IPC^{NR} , and **self-referential** otherwise;
- $IPC_{\rightarrow}^{NR(\times)}$ and IPC_{\rightarrow}^{NR} are similarly defined based on IPC_{\rightarrow} .

- Self-referential IPC-theorem exists. (Yu 2014):

- $\{\neg\neg\alpha \mid \alpha \in CPC \setminus IPC\} \subseteq IPC \setminus IPC^{NR}$
- $((((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q \in IPC_{\rightarrow} \setminus IPC_{\rightarrow}^{NR}$

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- Properties of non-self-referential realizable fragments

Prehistoric-cycle-free provable fragment

- For each logic mentioned above,
the *CF* (prehistoric-cycle-free provable) fragment
is a subset of
the *NR* (non-self-referential realizable) fragment;
 - The best known approximation;
 - Decidable, wieldy for simple formulas.

The underline calculus **G3[st4]**

$$\begin{array}{l}
 Ax. \quad \frac{}{p, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, p} \\
 L\rightarrow. \quad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \phi \quad \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\phi \rightarrow \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \\
 L\Box. \quad \frac{\theta, \Box\theta, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Box\theta, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \\
 4\Box. \quad \frac{\Theta, \Box\Theta \Rightarrow \eta}{\Box\Theta, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \Box\eta} \\
 \\
 L\perp. \quad \frac{}{\perp, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \\
 R\rightarrow. \quad \frac{\phi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \phi \rightarrow \psi} \\
 R\Box. \quad \frac{\Box\Theta \Rightarrow \eta}{\Box\Theta, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \Box\eta} \\
 K\Box. \quad \frac{\Theta \Rightarrow \eta}{\Box\Theta, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \Box\eta}
 \end{array}$$

- G3cp: $Ax, L\perp, L\rightarrow, R\rightarrow$;
- G3t: G3cp with $L\Box, K\Box$;
- $\Box\Theta := \{\Box\theta \mid \theta \in \Theta\}$.

- G3s: G3cp with $L\Box, R\Box$;
- G34: G3cp with $4\Box$.

Prehistoric graph and prehistoric cycle

- Given a proof tree $\mathcal{T} = (T, R)$, the **prehistoric graph** of \mathcal{T} is $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{T}) := (F, \prec)$, where
 - F is the set of families of positive \square 's in the proof tree \mathcal{T} ,
 - (take G3s for instance)
 - $\prec := \{ \langle i, j \rangle \mid \langle (\square\Theta(\square_i) \Rightarrow \eta), (\square\Theta(\square_i), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \square_j\eta) \rangle \in R \}$,
 - i.e., $\frac{\square\Theta(\square_i) \Rightarrow \eta}{\square\Theta(\square_i), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \square_j\eta} (R\square)$ is a step in \mathcal{T} .
- Given \mathcal{T} , a **prehistoric cycle** is a cycle in $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{T})$.
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- Given a proof tree $\mathcal{T} = (T, R)$, the **prehistoric graph** of \mathcal{T} is $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{T}) := (F, \prec)$, where
 - F is the set of **families** of positive \square 's in the proof tree \mathcal{T} ,
 - (take G3s for instance)
 - $\prec := \{ \langle i, j \rangle \mid \langle (\square\Theta(\square_i) \Rightarrow \eta), (\square\Theta(\square_i), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \square_j\eta) \rangle \in R \}$,
 - i.e., $\frac{\square\Theta(\square_i) \Rightarrow \eta}{\square\Theta(\square_i), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \square_j\eta} (R\square)$ is a step in \mathcal{T} .
- Given \mathcal{T} , a **prehistoric cycle** is a cycle in $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{T})$.
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Prehistoric-cycle-free fragments

- Definition:

- Let $X \in \{T, K4, S4\}$,
and $Y \in \{G3t, G34, G3s\}$, resp.;
 - $X^{CF} := \{\phi \mid (\Rightarrow \phi) \text{ has a cycle-free proof in } Y\}$.
- For a basic embedding $(\cdot)^x$:
 - $IPC^{CF(x)} := \{IPC \vdash \phi \mid \phi^x \in S4^{CF}\}$;
 - $IPC^{CF} := \bigcup_x IPC^{CF(x)}$;
 - $IPC_{\rightarrow}^{CF(x)}$ and IPC_{\rightarrow}^{CF} are similarly defined.
- $\in CF$ is sufficient to $\in NR$ (Yu 2010 & 2014):
 - If $X \in \{T, K4, S4, IPC, IPC_{\rightarrow}\}$, then $X^{CF} \subseteq X^{NR}$.

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Properties of *CF* fragments

- Let $X \in \{T, K4, S4\}$:
 - $\phi \in X^{CF}$ iff $\Box\phi \in X^{CF}$ (necessitation).
 - $\phi \in X^{CF}$ implies $\phi[p/\psi] \in X^{CF}$ (uniform substitution).
 - X^{CF} contains:
 - $\perp \rightarrow p$.
 - $p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$.
 - $(p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)) \rightarrow ((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow r))$.
 - $((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$.
 - $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$.
 - $\Box p \rightarrow p$ (for T, S4).
 - $\Box p \rightarrow \Box\Box p$ (for K4, S4).
 - X^{CF} contains all axiom instances in X .
 - Applying uniform substitution to the above.
- $\alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \alpha), (\alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \gamma)) \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \gamma)) \in IPC_{\rightarrow}^{CF}$.

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Applied to NR fragments

- Let $X \in \{T, K4, S4\}$:
 - X^{NR} contains all axiom instances in X .
 - by the fact that $X^{CF} \subseteq X^{NR}$.
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 - directly by Artemov's proof of internalization theorem.
 - X^{NR} is not closed under MP .
 - otherwise $X^{NR} = X$, contradiction.
- Thus, non-self-referentiality **can be abnormal**. (Yu 2017)
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Between NR fragments of ML's

- Easy to show are:
 - $T^{NR} \subseteq S4^{NR}$ and
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 - though we will not give a proof here...
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- Therefore, when going from a smaller ML to a greater ML, non-self-referentiality is not always conservative. (Yu 2017)


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
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
Between *NR* fragments of ML's (continued)




Between *NR* fragments of ML's (continued)



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


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
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
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
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
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Between *NR* fragments of ML's (contxnued)



P.S.: Not all instances come from Kuznets' κ 's, e.g., let $\iota = \diamond\Box p \rightarrow \diamond\Box\Box p$.

- Thanks!